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Many of us are disturbed
Far East.

qy

-

the situation in the

Things have happened there which have shocked and

confused us.

We are faced with an almost constant necessity

of adjusting our thinking to new developments in that area.
\.Je

cannot retreat from these developments.

Nor can

we strike out blindly at them in the vain hope that precipitous
action will alter their course.
way.

Either way is the irresponsible

And the gravest danger of the moment lies not so much in

the situation in Asia itself but in the irresponsibility in our
own midst--the irresponsibility that ignores complex problems
and feeds confusion; that spreads panic where the need for calm
is greatest; that hampers efforts to cope effectively with difficulties abroad.
If we can get beneath the smokescreen raised by this
irresponsibility, I think we wilJ find that the basic problem
of

~

American Far Eastern policy is the same problem that
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confronts us in all foreign policy.

It is, first, the problem

of identifying our own national interests--not the interests of
the British or the Indonesians or the Chinese--but the interests
of the United States.

Then, having done that , it is a problem of

acting as a group--a bipartisan group, I hope--in a manner best
calculated to safeguard those interests.

J(

It is important, therefore, to restate the fundamental
reasons for our concern with the Far East.

We are interested in

that area, in the first place, because all of us realize that it
has a very important relation to our own security.

Security,

however, is not merely a question of whether we have one base off
the mainland of Asia or two or three or four.

Bases are factors-

-important factors in security--but except to the inflexible arm
chair strategists, they are by no means the whole story.
It is possible to have all the bases and still lose a
war as the Japanese discovered in China.

On the other hand, it is

possible to begin with practically none of them and win one as we
lately demonstrated in the Pacific.

I say this,not because I wish

to minimize the importance of military considerations in foreign
policy, but because it is necessary that we do not fall into a
Maginot Line type of thinking about Formosa or any other position
in Eastern Asia.

Our peacetime Far Eastern policy, of course, must

aim in part at the maintenance of an integrated defense system in
the

~/estern

Pacific.

But our policy cannot be expected to give us
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there, anymore than it can· give us elsewhere, absolute security
in a military sense.
In the long run, it seems to me that we stand to gain
much more in terms of national safety if our policies in the Far
East are directed towards retaining the faith of Asia's voiceless
millions in the integrity and the

friendship of the United States.

In addition to considerations of security, we also have
long-standing economic and cultural interests in the Far East.
We must not overlook them because in a world of growing interdependence they should assume increasing significance.
If we are to pursue policies which safeguard our interests
in the Far East it is essential that we understand the situation as
it now exists in that part of the world.

Not the situation which

wishful thinkers like to believe exists.

Not the situation as it was

in the 19th Century or even as it was as late as 1945.

But the naked

reality of the Far East in 1950.
The keynote of Asia today is change--change compounded in
almost equal parts of a determination to end foreign domination and
a revulsion against misery as the normal condition of life.

Asians

are sick and tired of having their countries run for them.

They are

sick and tired of unnecessary privation and suffering.
upon the right to control their national lives.

They insist

And they insist that

their own leaders show a willingness and a capacity to deal with such
basic questions as mass hunger and sickness.

- 4That is the substance of the situation in the Far East
today.

It would be readily evident to all except for the intrusion

of the Soviet Union.

The

~ussians

did not create the changing circum-

stances in Asia, but they are fishing in the confusion to see what
can be caught in the way of material aggrandisement and increased
world power.

The actions of Soviet imperialism have already reversed

the trend in China from national independence back toward foreign
domination.
In calculating our Far Eastern policy, it is necess ary to
recognize that the black shadow of Soviet imperialism obscures the
entire situation.

But we must not, because of the shadow, lose

sight of the substance.

We must not be content merely with blind

opposition to communism in the Far East.

We oppose that ideology

because we know only too we l l from what has happened in Eastern Europe
and what is happening in China that it is wholly inconsistent with
the goals of independence and progress.
We have traditionally given positive support to these aspirations in the Far

East --~n

the Philippines and China, and more recently,

in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia.

We have supported them not merely

because we believe that they are worthwhi le and decent objectives in
themselves, but also because we believe that it is in our own interests
to do so.

Free peoples who are striving peacefully to improve their

lot are friendly peoples.

They are peoples who may be counted on

~

- 5 in promoting genuine collective security and a more stable and
fruitful world.
The basic principle of our Far Eastern policy, therefore,
should remain what it long has been--support of the peoples of
As i a in their desire to obtain or to protect their independence
and to improve their way of life.

In giving such support, however,

we must consider the total needs of the Free World and the limited
resources which we have available for meeting them.

We must also

choose the type of support--whether it be diplomatic, financial,
military or any other--to fit the specific need.

And finally we

must be certain that the native governments through which aid is
extended possess the capacity to use it effectively.
We need only to review events in China during the past
few years to realize such assistance as the United States can give
in itself
is not sufficien~to guarantee the triumph of freedom in the Far East.
During the war and immediate postwar period, the United States poured
to
billions of dollars into China. We sent General Marshall/help the

Chinese straighten out their dirriculties.

He went to assist in

1

~

~ ~·..bV'\'.Y
achieving what had long been the Generalissimo 1 s own policy--tfhe ~ ~_,J- fJ

peaceful solution of the internal Chinese problem of unity.

Even

~~

when peace proved impossible we continued to support the National

~/

Government with a militarJ mission and with some half billion dollars
more of economic and military aid.

Some have charged that Chiang's

colJapse was due to the inadequacy of American aid or to the Yalt a
Agreement.

The fact is that largely through the influence and help
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of the United States, China enjoyed, at the end of the war, a
greater degree of freedom from fo reign control and a more eminent
international position than ever before in her history.

Furthermore,

our military intelligence reports tell us that in December, 1945,
the Government of Chiang Kai-shek had

obtaine~

an overwhelming advantage over the Communists.

with American assistance,
Yet, exactly three yegs

later, this preponderance had been lost and the defeat of the Nationalist
armies on the mainland had become inevitable.
Was this colossal failure due to any lack of American aid?
Or to the Yalta Agreement?
officials in
Marshall,

We have the answers not only from our civilian

China~r~our expert military

~ledemeyer

observers--from Generals

~-u..... ~~If!.

and Barr A Tlle primary respansi hi J.ity for the

~anahly.-!'esteEi

co~se

u:ooB tfie inability or thE!: umn.ll1ngness of tho

C_9.ineJso GoverrJment. to make the nocosstr;y reforms v.·fiieh alone could.-haYe retained for it the suppm: t of the nation.
w~e

not defeated by the Camwmists.

~ruption

and incompetence.

The nationalist letrerers

'fhey were defea Led by their own

I

There would be no point in underscoring these unhappy developments in China except that they point up the necessity for recognizing
what we can and what we cannot do in our r elations with the Far East.
There is no virtue in doing in foreign affairs just to be doing .

And

there are situations in which inaction is preferable to ill-advised action .
The first thing that we cannot do is to assume primary responsibility for the solution of the internal problems of any major
Far Eastern country.

The peoples of those nations do not want and

- 7 will not acquiesce in solutions which come about primarily through
foreign intervention.

For the United States to intervene in Formosa,

for example, would be resented by the Chinese people at this time just
as they are learning to resent Soviet intervention.

It might win for

us the gratitude of a few hardpressed leaders of the Kuomintang, but in
the last analysis, it would evoke the same enmity that the Russians
are creating for themselves by their domination of the Peking
Government and by their activities in Manchuria, Sinkiang and
Mongolia .
By the same token we cannot make ourselves responsible-militarily or otherwise--for regimes which, because of their
failure to deal effectively with the problems of their peoples ,
have only the most dubious popular support.
What we can do in the present circumstances is to continue

-------

to support in an appropriate manner desirable changes which are
taking place in the Far East.
We can assist those governments which command the reasonable
respect of their citizens to strengthen the internal stability of
their countries and their capacity to resist aggresion.
We

~

keep the attention of the world focused relentlessly

on the unscrupulous, self-seeking Soviet imperialism in the Far East.
We can seek appropriate ways to frustrate the effort of
the present Communist masters in Peking to push the peaceful Chinese
people into aggressive adventures beyond China's borders.

- 8 We can encourage movements of the Far Eastern peoples
designed to promote regional unity.
Finally, we can keep our thinking on general foreign policy

--------

flexible.

Only in this way will we be able to act appropriately in

any given circumstances.

Above all, we must avoid the

~allacy

of

believing that consistency in forei gn policy lies in acting precisely
in the same manner in every part of the globe. It is, for example,
fantastic to suggest that what we have done in Greece we must also
~/

do in China, which has

~

times as many people, 60 times as great an

area, and a vastly different set of political and strategic problems.
The only consistency we need be concerned with is that with
which we devote ourselves to the protection of the security and all
the legitimate interests of the United States.

That is the basic

ingredient of a nonpartisan, nonpolitica+ approach.

Beyond it let

us exercise a litt le imagination and a great deal of discretion.

-
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Many of us are disturbe

by t l e situation in the

Far B st. tlhin ;s have happened there which h ve sl.ocked. and
"
confused us . We are faced with an almost constant neces&rity
of adjustin

our thinking to new develo menta in th t urea .
e cannot retreat from these developments .

Nor can

we strike out blindly at them in the vain hope that precipitous
action Will alter their course . Either way is the irresponsible
way .

And the ·ravest danger of the moment lies not

o much in

the sit·c< tion in Asia 1 tsel:r but in the irresnonsibllity in our
own midst--the irresponsibility that 1gnoreo convl x problems
and feeds confusion; that e re·ds panic where the need for ca lt!l
is greatest; th t ha

ers efforts to cope effectively with dif-

ficultles abroad .
If we can get beneath the smokescreen raieed by this
irresponsi 1li ty 1 I think we wil.l find that tLe bas ic p roblem
of ,A.'Tlerican Par Ea"tern policy 1e the .arne
us in all forei n ;'Olley .

roblem thut confronts

It is, first, t he 'roblem

ot identifyin g our own national interest- - not the interestsor

the Br1 tiah or the Indonesians or the Chinese- - u.t the interests
of the United States .

Then , h u.v1ng cione that, 1 t is a. proolE.m or

acting as a group- -a bipartisan group , I hope- - 1n a manner best
calculated to sareg Jard those interests .
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of the United States, China enjoyed, at the end of the war, a

greater degree of freedom fro m foreign control and a more eminent
international position than ever before in her history .
our military

intell~ence

Furthermore,

reports tell us that in Decemb er, 1945,

the Goverrunent of Chiang Kai-shek had obtained, with American ass1etance,
an overwhelming advantage ever the Communists .
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armies on the mainland had become inevita le .
tla.s··
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officials in China but also from our exp ert mili t nry ob serv er s-Marshall , Wedemeyer and Ba1·r .

f:r~m

Gener al s
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corrup tion and incompetence .
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what we can and what we c annot do in our relations with the b'ar E st.
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